Achieving Genuine Moments from Ordinary Origins: Sheldon Wolin, Hannah Arendt, and Jacques Rancière on Democracy by Yarbrough, Grant
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Theses Department of Political Science
Spring 4-5-2012
Achieving Genuine Moments from Ordinary
Origins: Sheldon Wolin, Hannah Arendt, and
Jacques Rancière on Democracy
Grant Yarbrough
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yarbrough, Grant, "Achieving Genuine Moments from Ordinary Origins: Sheldon Wolin, Hannah Arendt, and Jacques Rancière on
Democracy." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/42
 ACHIEVING GENUINE MOMENTS FROM ORDINARY ORIGINS: SHELDON WOLIN, 
HANNAH ARENDT AND JACQUES RANCIÈRE ON DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
GRANT HENDRICKS YARBROUGH 
 
 
 
 
Under the Direction of Dr. Mario Feit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper grapples with the differences between genuine and ordinary democracy within 
the political thought of Jacques Rancière, Sheldon Wolin, and Hannah Arendt. Each discusses 
the problems of ordinary democracy and offer solutions in terms of what I call genuine 
democracy. Ordinary democracy is the established norm of liberal democracy celebrated as the 
stable and a desired “end” of political action. It is what happens when politics as usual becomes 
the norm and shuts the people from the halls of power. Genuine politics exist within the structure 
ordinary democracy and seeks to achieve the continuous re-establishment of democratic 
processes while in the process speeding up and disrupting “politics as usual”. 
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1 
Introduction 
This paper looks at the tension, both antagonistic and temporal, between ordinary
1
 
democracy, which excludes and restrains the people
2
, and genuine democracy
3
 where people as 
citizens practice genuine politics.
4
 I look at genuine democracy resulting from ordinary 
democracy. Genuine democracy does not exist as a permanent structure, for precisely at the 
moment of institutionalization, it becomes ordinary. This moment of constitution represents a 
midpoint in the genealogy of democracy, prior to the mid-point lies the revolutionary struggle for 
the establishment of democratic ends;
5
 however, once achieved, the focus shifts to the desire to 
undermine those ends, causing the desire to attempt to revive the pre-constitution revolutionary 
actions through calls for a new founding or re-founding. Genuine democracy exists within the 
structure created by constituted government, what we most often see as ordinary democracy. It is 
an analogous to a bubbling liquid in a cauldron. The cauldron contains the factors leading to 
                                                 
1
In The prettier doll: rhetoric, discourse, and ordinary democracy, the authors discuss the contradiction within what 
they define as ordinary democracy. Persons must speak both as citizen and neighbor and “weave together social 
membership and citizenship” (Tracy, McDaniel, Gronbeck 2007, 226). The authors therefore place both political 
and non-political within their conception of ordinary. I focus on the purely political side of participation and note 
that genuine politics requires one to participate as a political being. Relegation to social being only leads to what I 
have defined as ordinary democracy. 
2
 Margaret Canovan delivers an in depth treatise on the subject of “the people” in politics and political thought. 
However, when I say “the people” I mean the inclusiveness of all citizens, regardless of age, voting, or immigration 
status in the constituted political system. What Canovan points out and to which I agree relates to the subject of 
genuine, “the people cannot be restricted to a group with definite characteristics, boundaries, structure or 
permanence though it is quite capable of [these]” (Canovan 2005, 140).  
3
 Part of the foundation of genuine democracy is a democratic ethos. “[A democratic ethos] entails an egalitarian 
constitution of cultural and political life that encourages people to participate in defining their own troubles and 
possibilities and to articulate those troubles in public and as citizens” (Euben 2001, 259). Fundamentally, genuine 
democracy, and the democratic ethos on which it is based, depends on individual citizen action and advocacy. To 
engage with others in a genuine fashion is to engage in a “partnership of virtue” and “learn to think and speak in 
public and as public beings” (Euben 2001, 263). Such genuine participation builds on a virtuous cycle to increase 
commonality. Unlike the Athenian polis however, this is not limited to a particular space. 
4
 I disagree with deliberative democracy literature, namely authors such as Benjamin Barber. However, as influence 
there is a vital degree of bottom up participation necessary for genuine democracy to occur and succeed. I also agree 
with him “that there is a civic ideal that treats human beings as inherently political” (Barber 2003, 8). 
5
 This paper does not take an ideological viewpoint that progressive politics would benefit from genuine democracy. 
In The Contemporary Political Movements of Jacques Rancière Todd May takes a leftist anarchic approach to the 
problem of maintaining a genuine democracy. However, he neglects to mention that not all re-founding approaches 
necessarily come from the left. This paper rejects revolutionary (as violent) action and pushes for genuine 
democratic action. 
2 
genuine democracy. The liquid represents the mass of people within the organizational structure 
of ordinary democracy yet that liquid represents the disruptive possibility of the people always 
present within the structure of government, namely, the ability to shift and explode into action.
6
 
Genuine democracy represents the tension both within and between the people and structure of 
government to fight against institutional control of citizen and politics. This said however, 
ordinary democratic structures maintain a vital role as they provide a necessary bulwark against 
anarchy or absence of structure.
7
   
As Arendt pointed out and the French Revolution demonstrated, unbounded political 
action by the people leads only to the complete destruction of existing political institutions, and, 
inevitably, the replacement of old structures with new that bring with them backlash of 
counterrevolutionary order.
8
 An adherence to democracy and democratic principles requires the 
potential, if not practical, inclusion of all people everywhere equally. The emergence (or re-
emergence of) widespread citizen protest, from the Tea Party and Occupy movements in 
America, to the Arab Spring, to the surprising demonstrations in Russia have all raised questions 
for me. How do temporality and disruption account for differences between genuine and ordinary 
democracy? Does ordinary democracy have a use in politics? Is disruptive behavior intrinsically 
detrimental to democratic politics or understandable and acceptable for democratic ends? How 
can (and or should) we strive to re-democratize the political arena? 
                                                 
6
 In Federalist 49, Madison argued that the constitutional aspect of America’s system was supposed to allow steam 
valves for release of public passions but overall keep the people from having too much popular sway over 
governance. 
7
 It is important to note that these conceptions of government take place within, above all, a democratic framework. 
8
 This is a common thread through the final chapter of On Revolution. Revolutions turn everything on its head. 
Arendt discusses the idea of a lost treasure as a way of looking at the past: gone has every part of society and its 
interpretation viewed within the context of the revolution. 
3 
Sheldon Wolin, Hannah Arendt, and Jacques Rancière each provide for views of what 
constitutes genuine and ordinary democracy.
9
 Genuine democracy implies an organic political 
response to the constraints of a structured political system. It is the idea that participation and 
debate create an outcome wherein individual citizen interest pools and manifests in political 
activity. Genuine democracy does not limit citizens to a confined definition; anyone who takes 
part in shaping their own stake in the polity declares their citizenship through participation in the 
disruptive nature of genuine democratic politics. Ordinary democracy is the inevitable 
consequence of constitution of a political order. It finds itself tempered and managed by the 
“elite”. The history of democratic governance has been the history of normalization and 
constraint on the people, directly or indirectly, through institutions and limiting the people’s 
ability to engage in genuine politics.
10
 Genuine democracy allows for a many-avenued entry into 
politics; ordinary democracy divides ruled from rulers.
11
 
These terms depend upon the ideas represented in the antagonistic as well as temporal 
dimension of politics. Genuine is the lack of an order, less a system of governance than an idea 
that the governed and the governors have the same claim to rule (Rancière 2007).
12
 The 
                                                 
9
 In Dissensus Jacques Rancière speaks on the Marxist understanding of the difference between “real” and “formal” 
democracy as well as the “Platonic distinction” between democracy as “written law” and “democracy as a form of 
individual and social life”. I want to be clear that I do not follow this literature with my distinctions of genuine and 
ordinary democracy. Genuine democracy occurs within and against the constituted system of law and order. I allude 
more to this in the chapter concerning the thought of Jacques Rancière. I also will substitute politics for democracy 
but only following genuine and ordinary. 
10
 See Bilakovics 2012, 89: “democracy is no longer democratic when it becomes affiliated with the economy of 
power that a governing state requires. This contrasts with a genuine democracy never lacking “revolutionary 
possibilities” (Bilakovics 2012, 217). 
11
 In Constituent moments: enacting the people in postrevolutionary America, Jason Frank makes the point that the 
“post-revolutionary crowd marks a democracy of the inarticulate insofar as it was perceived as a shadowy, virtual, 
inchoate identity without the crystallizing or articulating voice of a “leader” to give it form, to give it sovereign 
voice” (Frank 2010, 100). I reject this conception of people for all three authors, though Rancière’s demos comes 
closet. Genuine politics means that these shifting formless people take ownership and voice their politics. There is 
no need to give themselves a voice because it already exists, however for the politics to succeed a viewable entity or 
tangible idea must “exist”. 
12
 Also, see the introduction to De  mokratia: “Wolin rejects the idea that the democratic ideal is located within an 
institutional form; rather democracy is most fully realized in agonistic action that breaks with constitutional forms” 
(Ober and Hendrick 1996, 7). 
4 
distinction between genuine and ordinary involves such terms as fast/slow and 
disruptive/orderly. As contained within the tension of genuine and ordinary, democracy is a 
distinct language of time. 
Time is an ever-present part of democracy and political interaction. Interaction between 
individuals of necessity requires time to organize and communicate ideas and make demands on 
the governmental structure. Ordinary democracy uses the established procedure and structure of 
institutions to control time, often resulting in either “gridlock” or rushing consensus past the 
ability of the people to take time to understand
13
. Genuine politics disrupts procedure and breaks 
the monopoly on control of time bringing it within the domain of democracy.
14
 Citizens take 
back control of time though their participation in disruptive politics, genuine democracy occurs 
at the speed citizens set.
15
 Rather than becoming subject to a “set time” citizens’ participation is 
a part of time, acting in though not controlling, debate and discourse time. 
These three authors each take a point of view as to what the effect of constitution of 
democratic government is on the nature of genuine and ordinary democracy. Sheldon Wolin 
addresses the constitutive nature of government and the structuring and assigning of politics to a 
controlled speed vs. the continuation of formless, non-constituted politics that cannot be 
subjected.  
Hannah Arendt discusses democracy as participatory action leading to constitution as the 
end goal. She describes the move from the speed of revolution to the pace of constituted 
government. 
                                                 
13
 Bonnie Honig wrote an excellent book related to this subject called “Emergency Politics”. 
14
 See the procedural differences between the “aristocratic” Senate and the “populist” House and how they 
originated. 
15
 See Wolin “What time is it? And “Democracy and Counterrevolution” as well as Arendt discussion of the speed 
of revolution in chapter 6 of On Revolution 
5 
Finally, Jacques Rancière marks the difference between genuine and ordinary as that of 
“politics” vs. “police”. For Rancière, the police control the allotment of time and the 
dispensation of participatory elements. Genuine democracy surfaces alongside the disruption of 
the police’ control over time. Politics is the manifestation of individuals’ collective democratic 
demands for inclusion and participation, as well as difference from the oligarchic state.  
6 
Section 1: Sheldon Wolin 
Sheldon Wolin’s conceptualization of genuine democracy16 presents a notion that such a 
conception is “rare” and “episodic” (Wolin 1994, 1; Wolin 2005, 1). 17 It is an uphill battle to 
capture something that itself refuses to become encapsulated; the end of democracy is “how we 
equalize politically in acting together for shared purposes" (Wolin 1996, 24).
18
 It struggles 
against ordinary democracy where “modern democracy turns into a state; the state turns into a 
megastate; political power is omnicompetantly administrative and hence only marginally liable 
to scrutiny and check” (Kateb 2001, 43). Wolin seeks to find a level field where “ordinary 
citizens” become “political beings through the self-discovery of common concerns and modes of 
action for realizing them” (Wolin 1994, 11). Genuine democracy lies in the contestation, 
conversation, and synthesis of ideas. The point where genuine democracy is most easily 
accessible lies on one side of a gap; the other side consists of ordinary democracy, a “form” of 
governance. Constitution of government is partly responsible for the creation of this gap. 
The role of the demos leads to the moment of constitution, however once enacted a divide 
begins to take shape between the demos and ordinary democracy. However, it is also separated 
                                                 
16
 Wolin has a long and varied history on political thought. For this essay I focus on this thought on the very narrow 
subject concerning a genuine politics as Wolin approaches it, namely, that politics is a unique and specific 
phenomenon that engages citizens in a public display of their rights and desires. See Wolin on Theory and the 
Political by James Wiley. He notes that Wolin defends the subject of politics, i.e. genuine democracy, from its 
absorption into the more general social scientific establishment of Economics, Sociology, and Game Theory (Wiley 
2006, 216). He goes on to point out the difference between “the social” and “politics”. Somewhat unintentionally, I 
have adopted these terms with regard to ordinary (encompassing almost all aspects of organized human behavior 
within a specific governmental structure) and genuine (or “the political” as “the essence of politics” and “political 
engagement”) (Wiley 2006, 219). 
17
 A great deal of my zeal in defending the notion of Wolin’s democratic thought comes from Nicholas Xenos’ essay 
“Momentary Democracy”. Though the essay is very sympathetic to a formless view of democracy it nonetheless 
gives an excellent starting point for this section with the assertion that “it exists in the moments when we open 
ourselves and our communities to the unfamiliar and unsettling, then dissolves when a new familiarity and new 
settling takes place” (Xenos 2001, 36). 
18
 Kateb makes the claim that “genuine democracy, a continuous institutionalization of popular power through some 
apparatus of direct participation, is not desirable” (Kateb 2001, 47). I agree that a basis of direct participation 
(“participatory democracy”) is undesirable; however, the continuous, spontaneous, disruptive, insertion of the 
people into politics is desirable.  
7 
out such that a “voice” is more difficult to achieve. Yet the creation of a voice represents 
“discursive traditions that [emphasize], as the core of democracy, its demotic and participatory 
elements” (Wolin 1996b, 63). Less an end, genuine democracy is continual politics without 
constraint; the establishment of ordinary democracy leads to genuine democracy finding itself in 
opposition.
19
 In between is constitution as the manifestation of order, i.e., government. 
To describe this interplay between genuine and ordinary democracy Wolin uses a variety 
of varying terms to represent similar ideas; ideas such as “taking time” and “deliberative” note 
that genuine decisions are “arrived at” via bottom up citizen movements rather than “made” by a 
top-down structure of hegemonic government by bureaucratic fiat (Wolin 2005, 10). He also 
discusses genuine democracy in the terms of “fugitive” and “demotic” vs. ordinary democratic 
terms of “managed”, “electoral”, and “constitutive”. Wolin sees the constitution of government 
as the death knell of fugitive democracy and demotic participation and action. As soon as we 
decide on a system of rules, we begin to be ruled. Voting and elections are just ways in which we 
have a veneer of popular power when in fact it is merely the allowance of that power to be 
expressed every two or four years (Wolin 1994). For Wolin, genuine democracy exists when 
fluid movements arise spontaneously against the constraints of constitution, which Wolin calls 
“the political” (Wolin, 1994, 11). “The political” also exists as democracy freed from the 
constraints of constitution (Wolin 1994, 11). 
A rough opposite of the political, politics is “the legitimized and public 
contestation…over access to the resources available” it is “continuous, ceaseless, and endless” 
                                                 
19
 In “Wolin and Oakeshott, Similarity in Difference” Botwinick discusses Wolin’s separation of pre- and post- 
Constitution America as well as discussing the difference between “the body politic” or “political economy”. Before 
the Constitution was enacted, the former took precedent, post-Constitution it was the latter that gained supremacy. In 
discussing ordinary vs. genuine democracy, we can use these terms and situate them in a pre- and post- 
constitutional framework. Genuine democracy must fight against the subsuming of the political, (i.e. “by the 
people”) into the economic, as comprised of elites and technocratic experts (Botwinick 2001). 
8 
(Wolin 1994, 11). Wolin locates “politics” within the realm of a constituted democratic political 
system (Wolin 1994, 11, 13-14). Another way Wolin describes politics concerns “agitation” 
which he defines: “to ‘perturb, excite, or stir up’ [yet] can also mean ‘to discuss’” (Wolin 2005, 
3). He goes on to offer another definition of agitation as "the deliberative politics of 
representative legislatures” (Wolin 2005, 3). Agitation, works with both politics and the political 
and, in a temporal sense, both take time. When politics and the political are left undisturbed that 
they settle into ordinary. To use physics as an example, something “freezes” when its molecules 
are calmed or slowed down to the point where any movement is imperceptible. To the contrary, 
when something is agitated in a physical sense the molecules are stirred and heated up, and move 
faster. Thus, disruption intertwines with temporality, the more something is constrained, more 
solid and slowed down.
20
 On the other hand, agitation leads to a freeing up which leads to a 
speeding up which leads to more agitation.
21
 
Wolin has two conceptions of time in mind as well as and how they relate to genuine and 
ordinary democracy. In the first, time is caught up in agitation and (uncontrolled) revolution 
(though they have no control over it): “[r]evolutions …represent an effort to hurry events, and 
make things happen more rapidly”, genuine politics is “inspired intervention, sudden, short-
lived, dramatic, disruptive, uncooptable” it is time and agitation speed up to a boiling cacophony 
of movement and noise (Wolin 2005, 5-6). On the other hand, ordinary democracy is “orderly, 
stylized, shaped and limited by prescribed processes, procedures, even time-tables” (Wolin 2005, 
6). In the latter, there is no disruption or “transgression”, only politics as usual. Ordinary politics 
                                                 
20
 The more its molecules are constrained the slower they move, the more solid the object gets, which constrains the 
molecules more etc.  
21
 Also to include in this part, not sure where, is the idea that in addition to moving toward a constitutive moments 
we instead look at them as individuals pockets of constitutive moments, depending on what the goal is to achieve. I 
have in mind here movements, like the civil rights movement, the women’s movement and the gay rights movement, 
but also more individualized moments where small groups of citizens take to the streets to demand action on an 
issue like the freeing of a political prisoner or the protest of a Supreme Court decision. 
9 
and democracy, as the result of its own constitution, represent the “end”, ontologically and 
temporally, of democratic and political striving. The managed and orderly ordinary democracy 
exists in a frozen time.
22
 
Time and disruption move in accordance with which side of the constitutional divide they 
are located.
23
 Revolutionary time, as it lies on the pre-enacted side of constitution moves neither 
slowly, nor independently of events; it is caught up in a torrent of ideas and quickly swept along 
(Wolin 2005, 4-6)
24
. Unfortunately, Wolin’s momentary democracy outside of form equates 
more with anarchy than with genuine democracy. Ordinary democracy contains the anarchic 
elements of genuine democracy yet allowing it to build momentum. Without control, the 
spontaneous and unrestrained nature of the demos manifests to a detrimental degree the 
disruption of anti-democratic constitutionality. Within ordinary democracy however, the 
anarchic or spontaneous-ness of genuine, revolutionary politics disrupts the “normal” flow of 
political time: constitutionality “regulate[s]…the temporal rhythms or periodicity of politics, and 
they give it ritualistic forms, e.g. every four years the [people are allowed to vote]” (Wolin 1994, 
14). Furthermore, democracy as “movement rather than form” and “carried along by revolution” 
represents that which has already occurred; Wolin argues: “democracy is a rebellious moment 
that may assume revolutionary, destructive proportions, or may not” and succeeds “only 
                                                 
22
 In “Democracy as the Radical Ordinary” Romand Coles argues that even ordinary democracy exists in tension 
with itself. This could prevent a complete freezing of the political yet he also declares, “every particle of the 
ordinary is itself in episodic need of interruption” (Coles 2008, 171). 
23
Michael Shapiro discusses Wolin’s conception of ‘temporal disjuncture’ and ‘instability of political time’ (Shapiro 
2001, 233). He follows Wolin (and Rancière) that it is the theorist’s job to display the disjuncture that erupts 
between citizens with specific interests yet is contained by their role as citizens. Ordinary democracy paints over this 
rupture while genuine democracy cultivates it. 
24
 Wolin make a distinction between political time and cultural as well as economic time, the idea being that 
political time is what is “episodic and rare” while culture and economics are ceaseless (Wolin 1997). Constitution 
frees us from having to debate political time and leaves only cultural and economic time, which is why the 
“revolution fails at precisely the moment it succeeds”. See “Wolin as Critic of Democracy”: Kateb takes the 
Wolinesque view that “democracy can only be a moment…doomed to subside and to leave the prevailing structures 
intact” (Kateb 2001, 39). What we need then is disruption of the institutions of, but not the constraints on, 
democracy itself. 
10 
temporarily” (Wolin 1994, 23). Ironically then, genuine democracy exists when citizens organize 
themselves into corporations to “concert their power for…a thousand other common concerns of 
ordinary lives” (Wolin 1994, 24).25 
Wolin notes this disruption concerning ordinary democracy yet does not allow for a post-
constituted democratic politics. We must push back against politics as usual, as it already exists, 
rather than repeatedly attempting a new constitutional order. While Wolin bemoans “managed 
democracy” and the harm it does to democratic citizens, he does not consider that the “anarchic” 
nature of revolutionary agitation would, given no restraint, result in a vast but shallow pool, 
devoid of meaningful participation
26
. In such a conception, the lack of a way to channel political 
discourse or action would prevent a productive politics. What the constraints of bureaucratized 
government serve is to give leverage to democratic agitation, excessive boiling of the cauldron 
serves the same purpose as pouring it out, namely, the destruction of the substance of the 
agitation within
27
. Granted, this looks precisely like the “managed” nature of agitation Wolin 
fears, however, maintaining a constant revolutionary, antagonistic, though short of revolutionary, 
undercurrent is what keeps citizens informed, excited and participating. Thus rather than 
“crystallizing” and coalescing into a managed bureaucratic democratic state, there is a constant 
source of agitation and movement. Ironically, the actions of the bureaucratic state are what serve 
to agitate the people themselves. 
                                                 
25
 More on this later but it seems to deal more with “the necessities of life” than the political. 
26
 It is possible that Wolin does consider this point, that anarchic, agitative action overwhelms the status quo, and 
sets up a new constitutive moment, but that once this moment is achieved, the vast shallow pool is all we are left. He 
still does not seem to consider speed within this calculus. Action is dependent on speed to disrupt the status quo and 
while sometimes the speed of events can outpace the ability of actors to control them I believe Wolin would be 
accepting of this, provided that a backlash clamping down on freedom did not occur retroactively (a la the terror 
following the French Revolution). 
27
 See Wolin “Tending and Intending a Constitution” in Presence of the Past: post-constitutional political culture in 
America “can be accurately described as shallow: at one end, an elite culture…at the other, a mass culture” (Wolin 
1989, 99). 
11 
At the same time democracy is fleeting, its genesis (pre-constitution) lies in disorder and 
chaos.
28
 The enemy of genuine democracy therefore is the absence of politics either because of 
its systemization or because of its destruction via revolution. For Wolin: “chaos was the material 
of creativity” and “disorder…aroused the impulse to build societies” (Wolin 1960, 243). On the 
other side of this however lies fear of nothingness, Wolin describes the “state of nature” as “the 
condition of political nothingness” (Wolin 1960, 244). We can see political nothingness as 
anarchy, the lack of anything political, and the result of a scorched earth campaign against 
genuine democratic elements. The crystallization of politics occurs when one side “wins” the 
other “loses”. A genuine spirit of compromise therefore, degenerates into an ordinary game of 
“my way or the highway”.  
For Wolin’s democracy is “not ultimately about winning, but about acting together”, 
extra -constitutionally or -governmentally. Yet this does not address the problem of divide or 
boundaries. Under these conceptions, two methods of governance emerge. Constituted 
government that remains in place, as “a parallel politics of process—legislative, administrative, 
judicial, and military—[it] flows continuously of its own accord” (Wolin 1994, 14). Alongside 
exist the “revolutionaries” those who break out of the bounded nature of ordinary democracy can 
practice a genuine movement but one that is incomplete. Genuine democracy, for Wolin, 
contains no “political parties”, “government gridlock,” or “corporate welfare”, but it contains no 
solution for the continued existence of the productive side of democracy and economics. Wolin 
claims that for “there to be a democratic rejoinder”, the “alienated and politically disenchanted 
will have to learn how to become citizens rather than remain angry voters (or nonvoters), 
and…will need to be reacquainted with democracy” (Wolin 1996, 23). Wolin, unabashed in his 
assertion that his audience are left leaning or citizens un-decided and hurt by the interests of 
                                                 
28
 The Hobbesian state of nature is truly democratic. 
12 
those on the side of corporations and the right, shows that it is the destruction of politics we must 
fear not the boundaries themselves. Politics consists of the destruction and reconstruction of 
internal barriers allowing citizens to make their own voices heard while preventing a complete 
destruction of order.
29
  
                                                 
29
 Wolin does not seem to reconcile is that both sides use disruption for their purposes, and I would argue that the 
right has recently used it more effectively to “hijack” both national debate and the public mood. The procedures of 
the Tea Party and the “Contract for America” that Wolin refers to follow the normal creeds of ordinary democracy; 
get your supporters angry and voting, but-and this is the important part-do not allow them to talk. Disruption by one 
side cannot be expected to begin a political conversation. Rather, it breaks down the wall between the two sides of 
genuine and ordinary democracy to allow for the possibility of conversation. 
13 
Section 2: Hannah Arendt  
Arendt does not approach the concepts of genuine and ordinary as contradictory; rather, 
the momentum provided by genuine democracy leads to the establishment of ordinary 
democracy, however, once established genuine democracy sets itself against ordinary 
democracy. While Wolin fears the achievement of constitution will be the death of genuine 
democracy and politics
30
, Arendt argues that the achievement of an effective constitution (via 
revolution) in America has led to a deification of the founding fathers and what they 
accomplished therefore prevents new attempts at a re-founding.
31
 In the American case, this state 
of affairs removes the realm of politics from the unworthy citizen
32
, rethinking the source of 
rights and participation in order to expand them becomes a blasphemous sacrilege.
33
 Therefore, 
lost is the ability for us to participate in revolution as the founders did and experience for 
ourselves the thrill of politics. 
As if we would profane such a sacred undertaking were we to attempt the same “miracle” 
work as they did. The “lost treasure of the revolution” exists because we have moved the 
founding to the realm of the sacred and consequentially, governing, to the realm of ordinary 
                                                 
30
 Jeremy Waldron however makes this same claim for Arendt stating “often her tone is one of lamentation, close to 
despair, that certain things that might have been done are now impossible, that we have closed off certain practical 
possibilities in the way we have nurtured our political heritage” (Waldron 2010, 19). There is a similarity the 
“fugitive democracy” of Wolin and the “lost treasure” of Arendt. Benhabib, in the same volume expresses the 
opposite sentiment of Waldron and argues instead that “human equality supervenes upon a basic fact of the human 
condition, namely to the every present capacity to initiate the new and the unprecedented” (Benhabib 2010, 4). This 
approach too is taken with Wolin, see footnote 13. 
31
 Arendt ties founding to religion in the Roman context, I have applied it here to the American. As she says, 
“religious and political activity could be considered almost identical” and “the binding power of foundation itself 
was religious” (Arendt 1968, 121). The American Constitution and Founding Fathers receive the same degree of 
reverence. 
See also Bonnie Honig’s excellent article on Arendt’s understanding of the founding: “Declarations of 
Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic” APSR, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 
97-113 
32
 I disagree here with Margaret Canovan who likens the US Constitution with the founding of Rome and the 
Catholic Church. This kind of permanence is exactly what excludes the citizen and leads to ordinary government 
(Canovan 1994, 108). 
33
 One might look at the rhetoric over the “strict constitutionalist” view of the Constitution. The Constitution can be 
changed by legislative and appealing to the people but any attempt to re-examine it in anew context is met with stiff 
resistance. 
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democracy. Arendt understands genuine democracy manifesting as “action”: the ability of 
citizens to engage in politics by entering the polis and utilizing political speech.
34
 Genuine 
democracy asserts itself in the process of founding
35
 and for this to be achieved citizens must 
undertake the “miraculous” action that only exists within the political arena. Ordinary democracy 
is born from the constitution of barriers. Revolution is the final step on the path that ultimately 
leads to that which it has previously undermined; therefore, the end of constitution both 
temporally and ontologically is revolution. Genuine democracy disrupts ordinary through 
continuous re-founding; instead of a fixed, unalterable point in time, politics is ongoing and 
mutable. Genuine democracy is the interplay of action and politics. For Arendt, rather than 
briefly gaining access to, we achieve a lasting genuine democracy. We gain access by leaving the 
private realm and overcoming the “necessities of life” (Arendt 1968, 12).36 Once able to leave 
the private realm of economics we understand politics as what “arises in what lies between men 
and is established as relationships” (emphasis mine) (Arendt 2005, 95). We practice politics 
when we converse with each other and approach politics as a gathering of free, political 
individuals separated from worldly influence. The “world” and “history” are loaded terms that 
                                                 
34
 Barber criticizes Arendt, noting, “the lethargic, the apathetic and the alienated will be excluded” (Barber 2003, 
227). However, here the order has been reversed. They are loathe to participate because the revolution has 
succeeded and deification of the originators discourages new disruption. When citizens participate in continuous re-
founding, even their apathy can have political undertones as it displays a lack of agreement with current thought. 
Earlier he notes this when he declares in reference to Arendt’s call to action “In states defined by watching rather 
than doing…citizens, like spectators everywhere, may find themselves falling asleep” (Barber 2003, 123). 
35
 Consisting of the breaking down and reconstruction of internal barriers within the “natural order” of governmental 
boundaries. 
36
 Markovits points out the important connotation with regard to the thought of Hannah Arendt. On the one hand, we 
must overcome these necessities to act in politics, the reverse, “overwhelming concern for one’s private life… 
[has]…disastrous consequences” (Markovits 2008, 175). We are to “direct our judgment away from the interior [-
economic well-being] and back to the properly political” (p177).  
Unlike the French Revolution, ancient Athens solved the problem of necessity with land, for them “too little 
property would leave a citizen without sufficient resources for an active public life; too much…diverts his attention 
and capacities from [public life]” (Euben 2001, 263). Though we leave the private realm of the hearth and home, we 
still keep our interests in mind when we engage in public discourse so that “property remains public even when it is 
private” (p263). 
Just as it is difficult to separate the symbiosis, post revolution, between life’s necessities and political participation, 
so we cannot disentangle genuine from ordinary democracy. Genuine democracy exists as a vital subset. 
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bring with them particular and lasting prejudices that cannot be overcome to achieve genuine 
politics. “All such prejudices… are judgments formed from the past” and are not “stupid chatter” 
but contain an “inherent legitimacy” (Arendt 2005, 151-152). Because of this, not only must we 
free ourselves from life’s necessities but also ignore knowledge of “the world”. This is not to say 
that we do not bring our own prejudices and worldly issues with us into politics but instead we 
bring only our personal understanding and knowledge. Arendt argues that the support for these 
unassailable prejudices comes from socialization with others and stems from generalizations and 
stereotypes incorporating phrases such as “they say” or “people say” and to which I add, 
“everybody knows”. However, once left to our own understandings and engaging with others 
who leave behind those common prejudices we are able to take on a new understanding and 
arrive at greater accommodation. Arendt calls this politics; I call it genuine democracy. 
A simple reading of Arendt accepts the foundational aspects of ordinary democracy as a 
post-revolutionary constitution that grants rights and freedoms through voting and elections and 
stands directly opposed to the totalitarian structures of Soviet Russia, Communist China and 
Nazi Germany.
37
 Yet she also advocates for genuine politics to work within ordinary democratic 
structures resisting collectivism and political stasis. Arendt declares that the “the end of rebellion 
is liberation, while the end of revolution is the foundation of freedom” (Arendt 2006, 140). 
Arendt in doing so tells us that the goal of revolution and rebellion is foundation or “ordinary” 
democratic activity.
38
 By understanding that foundation is the end goal, Arendt’s thought fits 
with a viewpoint of ordinary democracy where politics is ended and governing begins.  
                                                 
37
 Arendt distinguishes between ordinary democracy, ordinary politics, and genuine democracy. 
38
 I use foundation not as a place to stand but as a set of constraints guiding our interactions. However, other authors 
refer to foundations as a base. In this sense it is possible for democracy to exist without a moral “base” but we agree 
to foundations when agree to constitution of the body politic. Here Canovan speaks of Arendt’s “anti-
foundationalism” (Canovan 1994, 196) yet I refer to Kateb’s interpretation of foundation as “a frame of institutions” 
(Kateb 1984, 19). 
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Authority as we once knew it, which grew out of the Roman experience of 
foundation and was understood in the light of Greek political philosophy, has 
nowhere been re-established, through either revolution or the even less promising 
means of restoration, and least of all through the conservative moods and trends, 
which occasionally sweep public opinion. (Arendt 1968, 141) 
 
Consequentially, the citizens, who made the revolution and subsequent constitutional foundation 
by leaving their homes, have completed their task and are now encouraged to return home. The 
people had their genuine moment in the form of revolution, now “freed” from the burdens of 
politics and governing they must leave politics to the experts
39
 and return to their private 
economic lives.
40
 
Arendt’s view of ordinary democracy stems from an understanding that the revolution 
cannot and should not be maintained and that where “permanent revolution” is attempted, the 
outcome is horribly contorted (Arendt 2006, 40-41). Arendt traces the history of modern 
revolution to the French in 1789 and notes “there has never been such a thing as several 
revolutions, that there is only one revolution, selfsame and perpetual”. We can look here too at 
an inversion between the American Revolution (with “man [as the] master of his own destiny”) 
vs. the loss of ability of the French actors to “control the pace of events”. Really, it is not the 
revolutionary overthrow of government but the civil and useful revolution of genuine democratic 
politics that cannot be maintained. It too easily dismisses politics; to maintain genuine 
democracy requires that we maintain control of ourselves. 
                                                 
39
 Canovan agrees this this inevitability. Stating that the “people must have edges” but that the “boundaries of a 
particular people are accidental” she seems to support the necessity that “the people” must leave governing to 
“strong leadership” otherwise “the plural capacity for action continually frustrates attempt to predict and control the 
outcome of projects” (Canovan 2005, 56). 
Andreas Kalyvas engages this thinking in a footnote on pg. 254 of Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, 
noting that critics of Arendt claim that she neglects the ordinary. However, Kalyvas goes on to show that Arendt’s 
“approach is remarkably similar to Schmitt’s discussion of normal, constituted politics” (Kalyvas 2008, 255). In 
other words, ordinary democracy is the goal, but genuine is how we get there. 
40
 This creates another problem though as the world of the social will overtake and overwhelm the world of the 
political, which is the only place where action can occur. For more see Hannah Pitkin The attack of the blob: 
Hannah Arendt's concept of the social. She offers a critique of the social as detrimental to the political as “ordinary 
people doing ordinary things” becomes the “fatality of some monstrous ‘it’ trying to take ‘us’ over” (Pitkin 1998, 5) 
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Arendt addresses the problems the French faced during the revolution as acting “out of 
time” but then discovering the inherently difficult nature of “[leaving their] private dwelling[s.]” 
Unlike the Americans, who were able to reconcile public and private affairs, the French, once 
forced into the public space, were never “liberated from tending to the necessities of life”.41 
"[They] could enter the public space, the agora, where [they] moved among and spoke freely 
with…equals” but they were still saddled with the burden of living private lives (Arendt 2005, 
xxvi). In referring to the ancient Attic case concerning democracy Arendt notes the link between 
the French and their historic ties to the old feudal system. The sheer number of people cannot 
escape the necessity of eking out an existence thus creating a politics that placed the need for 
bread before political constitution. Thus while the people had gained their freedom from political 
tyranny in the form of the monarch, they were still yoked to the tyranny of poverty. In contrast, 
the American Revolution, comprising as it did men who were free to leave their estates and enter 
the political space, declared themselves independent of the political tyranny of the English crown 
but had already overthrown the yoke of poverty thanks to the bounty of the new world. 
Arendt understands that for a stable establishment of constitution, the separation of power 
as well as the understanding that the sources of law and power must be separated. Arendt tells us 
that when the colonists declared their independence from England they immediately began the 
work of community building, of a new founding. Yet they were also able to build on structures 
of the past and the Romans as well successfully followed this plan.  
The problem lies in the permanent revolution-ordinary but not democratic - as 
differentiated from a permanent re-founding - genuine but not democracy. Arendt goes on to say 
that the actual work of forming a constitution and solidifying action differed little from what the 
                                                 
41As Benjamin Barber explicitly states the “old French Revolutionary obsession with [the] economic question 
(security) that had greeted the first great ‘terror’ …in time led to the vanishing of the political question (liberty) 
(Barber 2010, 263). 
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colonists had followed from the signing of the Mayflower compact 200 years earlier. The 
pilgrims understood that wherever they traveled they carried the polis with them. The revolution 
succeeded because the people channeled their disruptive nature into the everyday process of 
governing. What Arendt argues that that the colonists never based their legitimacy on King or 
Parliament but in their pledges to one another to “combine themselves together into a ‘civil Body 
Politik’” (Arendt 2006, 166). This led those same pilgrims, 150 years later, “to pledge to each 
other our lives…and sacred honor”. The American Revolution began when the pilgrims left 
England. Thus from the Mayflower Compact through the Revolution the colonists were 
simultaneously able to engage in genuine democracy and participate in an every-day governance. 
The politics of revolution were never necessary.  
In this conception, permanent revolutionary politics exist wholly different from 
foundational politics. It practices a politics that shuns organizational or representative roles and 
relies on direct, antagonistic, and sometimes anarchic elements. Eventually either a more 
organized politics emerges or the revolution degenerates into tyranny. Under these 
circumstances, a “revolutionary council” harnesses the popular fervor of the revolution then caps 
it. It is against this constraint that genuine democracy must resist.  
Genuine politics and the recovery of the “lost treasure” consist, for Arendt, of continuous 
re-founding and re-mythologizing. Arendt discusses the “lost treasure of the revolution” in the 
sense that the Founding Fathers achieved a great and miraculous thing and now we are living out 
its end. We have settled into an ordinary routine where we look to the past, to a “strict 
constitutionalist” view. We are “successors on who it will be incumbent…to improve and 
perpetuate the great design formed by the ancestors” as politically autonomous citizens active 
and engaged in perpetuating the civil interest (Arendt 2006, 195). Ordinary democracy either in 
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the modern American context or represented by that of the permanent revolution removes the 
potential for amending and augmenting that which was decided at the foundation (or declaration 
of permanent revolution) In either context we are shut from power or the boundaries which are 
necessary to push against are removed preventing a cohesive politics from forming. It is a fine 
line for Arendt to walk, between the legitimacy bestowed upon a revolution (the “immortal 
constitution”), as displayed in the French Case, and the problem of “perpetual” union in the 
American Case (Arendt 2006, 194, 235). 
Unfortunately, the problem with this conception means that those who are not give the 
freedom from economics leads to a two-tiered class this problem has been partially solved by a 
representative system of democracy but this shuts people from government even more while 
preventing those without economic freedom from ever being able to participate. This leads 
Arendt to assert that politics can only exist between equals and that as a result the only time 
politics can exist is within an oligarchic system where a few higher individuals are equal due to 
their freedom from “the necessities of life”. The American case works because citizens are equal 
by virtue of yeoman farmer. Where a man has the possibility for providing for himself and his 
family politics can exist. Yet this is a fable, much as the myth of the Athenian “democracy” 
contained numerous women, slaves, and foreigners with little to no rights. The freedom in 
question is the lack of want for what makes daily life possible, thus freedom means leisure [to 
pursue politics, i.e., to speak]. Those who lack this freedom necessarily lack the equality 
necessary for politics. 
Genuine democracy is the rebellion against such restrictions on participation in politics. 
Arendt recognizes this in her description of pre-Constitution America. The people rose against 
economic restrictions, and in doing so, created a new political landscape. The enacting of 
20 
Constitution however, freed the people of politics, thus relegating them to a passive status. At the 
pinnacle of pre-constitutional politics, a contract for ordinary foundation obviates the need for a 
political citizenry. The new stewards of democracy tell us: we have succeeded you can go home. 
Arendt juxtaposes the ancient conceptions of freedom and politics with the modern conception of 
leisure and influence. Under the ancient definition, freedom meant leisure to pursue politics. 
However, this created a bifurcated society where those with the leisure to engage in politics 
depended upon those who enjoyed none for they had no freedom from labor. These burdens 
prevented the possibility of political experience and so created non-political classes. Politics as 
part of the public domain also means that politics and the political require community, that is, in 
a non-economic (thus, non-private) realm.
42
 The economic is individual; it does not require 
speech or action between equals. The polis, market, or public square becomes the focus of 
political action, as this is where political actors gather to discuss. Political inclusion for all 
people requires that the people have the ability to engage in “democratic”, i.e. equal, discourse. 
Genuine democracy requires a degree of leisure time removed from the social realm devoted to a 
gathering of individuals in the purely political realm.   
                                                 
42
 See chapter 8 of The Human Condition. 
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Section 3: Jacques Rancière 
Rancière’s thought grapples with politics post-constitution.43 Whereas Arendt and Wolin 
agonize over the achievement of constitution and what that means for a genuine democracy
44
, 
When Rancière acknowledges, “We do not live in democracies…We live in states of oligarchic 
law,” he recognizes that we are in a post-democratic mode of politics.45 This ordinary politics46 
consists of the congealed and solidified politics that prevents the breakthrough of democracy to 
disrupt the existing order. Rancière understands the conceptions of politics and police to 
delineate the ability to participate, or suffer exclusion from, democracy. Democracy for Rancière 
is not a system of government it is the continual disruption of the system of government .That 
force, or group, disrupts the system of elite control over society by demanding an equal voice in 
the distribution of control over functions of society. This is not to say that democracy equals 
anarchy, though from the vantage point of elites, it would certainly look that way. Instead, 
“democracy is the practice of politics; it is the expression of the logic of equality through its 
assertion by those who have been told, for one reason or another, that they have no part in the 
determination of their collective lives” (May 2007, 25). The police dictate the function of 
democracy. From here, I call this ordinary democracy, divided into citizens and elites, ruling and 
ruled. Rancière hopes to “[reconfigure] the territory of the sayable, seeable, thinkable, and 
possible” so as to generate a leveling of political arena (Simons and Masschelein 2010, 513). 
                                                 
43
 I take the term post-constitution because of the focal point constitution plays in this essay. However, another term 
for this post-constitution can be found in Willis “Theology in Post-Democracy” which represents a similar notion of 
the coalescence of institutions and corporatism within a de facto democratic system. The democratic institutions 
exist however; they are co-opted by elitist control. 
44
 For this section, I substitute “democracy” for genuine democracy and “oligarchy” or “oligarchic” for ordinary 
democracy. 
45
 “Postdemocracy for Rancière promotes therefore more than just a consensual blueprint for coexistence. It cements 
a state led, unidimensional perception of the world where constitutive conflicts and disagreements have been 
evacuated from ‘the realm of visibility’” (Tambakaki 2009, 107). This notion of postdemocracy represents a 
foundation of what I try to understand about the nature of genuine democracy. It does not seek to establish itself 
only to assist in the formation of a more egalitarian democratic politics. 
46
 Not to be confused with “politics in the ordinary sense) as particular social sphere or particular form of action)” 
(Marchart 2011, 130). 
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Democracy is the dichotomy of “us vs. them” and antithetical to the egalitarianism. This leads 
another requirement for the establishment of genuine democracy, that of equality.
47
 
Equality is an essential part of Rancière’s thought as it undermines the relationship 
between rulers and ruled. In obeying the actions of the police, the demos must understand the 
commands given: “Anyone capable of understanding an order is no longer in need of one” (May 
2007, 24). Thus, within this communication, a form of equality exists and for a moment, the 
distinction between giver and receiver or orders is blurred. Equality then is the lynchpin for 
genuine democracy.
48
 This equality however, manifests as the creation of a society of individuals 
of men, rather than as citizens. Citizens cannot enact democracy; this is an opportunity only to 
men who are independent of the anti-egalitarian institutions that are intertwined with society. 
The nature of institutions and democracy is inherently anti-egalitarian due their composition by 
groups. Only individuals as “men” can exist for when any structures are created, they are part of 
the police, rather than the disruptive politics that aim at outflanking the police.
49
  
“We do not live in democracies…We live in states of oligarchic law,” says Jacques 
Rancière. Ordinary democracy is oligarchic, a rule by elites antithetical to genuine politics. 
Genuine democracy, however, draws strength from the idea that the basis for rule is that there is 
                                                 
47
 In a critical essay on Rancière, Marchart argues equality in the Rancièreian sense cannot be valid for to assume an 
equal politics (by lot, for everyone) would result in the “end of democracy” as it would “rid democracy of all 
politics” (Marchart 2011, 139). This is an interesting supposition but what is also assumes is a lack of structure of 
any kind, for to assign lot still means to assign a role “above” that of some other part of the population. We always 
return to the point where genuine democracy consists of that other part trying to gain entry into ordinary democracy. 
48
 See Jodi Dean “Politics without Politics” in Reading Rancière: “when equality appears it appears within the order 
of the police. Politics forces it to appear and so changes this order, but the appearing remains within the order of the 
police. The order of the police is a condition for equality’s appearance” (Dean 2011, 89). 
Also: Tanke: Jacques Rancière: an Introduction pg. 56-57 
Rancière states in the same volume “equality…must be verified continuously-a verification or an enactment that 
opens specific stages of equality. These stages are built by crossing the boundaries and interconnecting forms and 
levels of discourse and spheres of experience” (Rancière 2011, 15). 
49
 Only by positing the elimination of delineations can an egalitarian nature of individuals as equals manifest, 
otherwise the result is some form of oligarchic (ordinary) democracy. Unfortunately the removal of institutions 
removes the container that exists formulate the “wrongs” which exist because of democracy. In other words, the 
oligarchic nature of democracy creates the police, which results in politics, a self-perpetuating cycle. 
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no basis for rule. It is the casting of lots or the “decision of God” that determines who will lead. 
The tension between these two conceptions creates a break, a “hatred” by elites and others who 
deem themselves “entitled to govern men by their birth, wealth, or science” (Rancière 2007, 94). 
In other words, there is a disjoint between our desire collectively to be equal vs. our desire as 
individuals to be treated preferentially. For the rule by God is only the last form, preceding it are 
the norms of ordinary democracy. When we choose leaders for their wealth, birth or knowledge 
they will preserve that system for those like themselves and we end up with an exclusionary 
system of governance that solidifies into permanence. Against this permanence must act those 
who have no claim to rule for theirs is the self-perpetuating legitimacy. The demos are those who 
disrupt the static nature of ordinary politics, in doing so the establishment of rule by no one 
breaks down the distinction of “them and us” as the rulership is constantly in flux.50 
Rancière identifies a group of people that exist within ordinary democracy and hold 
within themselves the greatest potentiality for genuine governance. He identifies this group as 
the “demos”. Rancière declares “the demos is not the population, the majority the political body 
or the lower classes” (Rancière 2010, 53).51 Instead, the demos represents everyone and 
everything that has been rejected by those with legitimate appeals to power, birth wealth and 
knowledge (Rancière 2010, 52).
 52
 The surplus community comprises those who have no 
qualification to rule, at once everyone and no-one (Rancière 2010, 53). The idea of a “surplus 
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 There is another distinction at play here as well. Ordinary democracy declares that we are all democrats, genuine 
democracy functions when the plebs (a subset of the populous) have “partial demands” but “aspire to constitute a 
truly universal populous” (Laclau 2005, 93-94). Yet Laclau points out that within ordinary democracy “there is no 
room for distinction…between economic struggle and political struggle”, like he and Rancière, the focus is on only 
the political as “the other simply involves the death of politics and its reabsorption by the sedimented forms of the 
social” (Laclau, 154-155). Genuine democracy exists as the political subset within greater society. 
51
 The demos existing of everyone else has led to what Benjamin Arditi calls a “second tier of politics in civil 
society (Arditi 2007, 145). This second tier grants access into politics for groups that have similar interests, a so 
called “post-liberal archipelago” that includes “viral actions” and “networked initiatives” (Arditi 2007, 145-146) 
52
 Shapiro calls this “a logic of disparity rather than of common identity” (Shapiro 2001, 232) 
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community” manifests in many different ways.53 On the one hand, a surplus or supplement can 
be the extra, the leftovers, or the overflow. Taken another way it is a bounty, a boon, the result of 
efficiency and productivity. Either way the surplus is ancillary to the other that is used and 
produced. It is always extra. They are the addition to politics and police as Rancière sees it. The 
time for rule based on birth, knowledge, or wealth has been exhausted. Into this void step the 
demos; the people insert themselves into politics and in instituting equality.
54
 
This itself is a quandary, how to guarantee, to institutionalize that which in its very 
essence defies institutionalization? How do we preserve democratic tendencies when those 
tendencies lead to the usurpation by organized governance? Rancière gives us the opposing 
notions of police and politics. “The police is a distribution of the sensible…whose principle is 
the absence of void and of supplement” (Rancière 2010, 36). Police is the functional apparatus of 
governing, of ordinary democracy. It is voting institutions, bureaucracy, lobbyists, and PAC’s 
and the ability to enforce them. It is the first six of the reasons to rule, based on the reasons 
common to the history of political rule: heredity, money, and knowledge (Rancière 2007, 39-41; 
Rancière 2010, 30-31). Police is the functioning of government and society according to the 
machinations that produce, “groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these 
occupations are exercised” (Rancière 2010, 36). The “police state” confines the exercise of 
politics. It is where there is no space for being just to be. Within the police state, ordinary 
democracy continues.  
Rancière’s introduces “consensus” as “the reduction of politics to the police” and “the 
reduction of the people to sum of the parts of the social body” (Rancière 2010, 42). The 
definitions and use of police and consensus represent the things within ordinary democracy that 
                                                 
53
Plato articulated a negative interpretation with his diatribe on drones and the negative role they have in the 
community. 
54
 See Tanke, Jacques Rancière: An Introduction pp. 61-65. 
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prevent the people as demos from breaking through and reclaiming their power to rule. Put 
another way: “because a group has no part, its claim to have a role, that is, to become visible, 
challenges the grounds on which the distribution of the sensible has taken place in the hands of 
the police, namely, inequality” (Ferris 2009, 40). True that the “claim to have a role” exists as 
the absence of such a claim but this is what makes democracy genuine. The elimination of the 
police levels the playing field among all citizens such that has an equal possibility of ruling and 
being ruled. However, we do not usually consider democracy and police state to exist within the 
same realm it they can coexist through the machinations of continuity, economics, and society.
55
 
The police or state of “consensus” is “ordinary”, there is no chance, no differentiation, “a return 
to the normal state of things” everything proceeds according to plan (Rancière 2010, 43). 
Fighting against the enforcement of police is the democratic nature of what Rancière’s 
calls dissensus “the presence of two worlds in one” (Rancière 2010, 36). Genuine bubbles up 
within ordinary democracy and pushes against, disrupting the uniformity of the latter. Opposing 
the rigidity and formula of the police, “[genuine democracy] consists in disturbing this 
arrangement by supplementing it with a part of those without part… [Genuine democracy] is an 
intervention in the visible and the sayable” (Rancière 2010, 37). Genuine democracy represents 
the possibility of extra-ordinary action. Applied to Rancière’s conception, genuine politics both 
undermines and creates itself. It breaks down and fights against the construction of new barriers 
to the practice of politics. Ordinary democracy of consensus and the police exist to divide and 
separate, preventing disruption by groups through isolating the individuals that comprise those 
groups. Yet Rancière is hesitant to declare that in order for genuine democracy to supplant 
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 I have in mind the Foucauldian idea of surveillance of power. Each member of the community exists as a cog in 
the greater machine of government/economics. The spaces which otherwise would contain self or identity do not 
exist. Ordinary democracy consists in this way, it is the lack of spaces for individuality or for Rancière: “dissensus”. 
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oligarchy the former must completely break down and destroy the latter. Rancière sees Wolin’s 
problem of fugitive democracy and responds that we must resist an end of politics. 
The ‘end of politics’ is the ever present shore of politics…itself an activity 
that is always of the moment and provisional….The ‘return of politics’ thus boils 
down to the assertion that there is a specific place for politics. Isolated in this 
manner, this specific place can be nothing but the place of the state…the ‘return 
of politics’ in fact announce[s] its extinction. [It is identified] with the practices of 
the state, the very principle of which consists in the suppression of politics 
(Rancière 2010, 43).  
 
The practices of ordinary democracy are established. It is the purpose of genuine politics 
to disrupt this monolith controlled by oligarchs and bureaucrats. Rather than create an “end” 
genuine democracy acts as gadfly within an ordinary democratic structure. Looked at another 
way, the “end of politics” is ordinary democracy, for under this system politics has been shut 
down in favor of order, thus there can be no more progress or movement. Ordinary “‘democracy’ 
would be something like an ‘oligarchy’ that leaves enough room for democracy to feed its 
passion” (Rancière 2007, 74). Establishing an ordinary democracy frees “the multitude…of its 
worry of governing… [and leaves it] to its private and egotistical passions” (Rancière 2007, 75). 
Governing is something that takes place under ordinary circumstances. The boiling cauldron of 
disruption results in a re-organization rather than overthrow of the status quo. Reaching an end to 
politics elevates and entrenches a few at the expense of the remainder, genuine democracy 
occurs when the remainder reacts against the oligarchic tendencies of ordinary democracy. 
To say that a political movement is always a movement that displaces the given 
boundaries, that extracts the specifically democratic, i.e., universalist, component 
of a particular conflict of interests in such and such a point of society, is also to 
say that it is always in danger of being confined to that conflict, in danger of 
ending up being no more than a defense of a particular group interests in always 
singular struggles” (Rancière 2007, 84).  
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The boundaries are the limits of a particular conflict. Genuine democracy acts against those 
specific boundaries yet also allows for greater unified action against the larger hegemony of 
oligarchic government. 
Yet this provides a benefit, oligarchy is stifling yet within stirs genuine democracy and, 
rather than displacing ordinary democracy, creates the possibility of constant (re)formations. 
Thus a “political demonstration is therefore always of the moment and its subjects are always 
precarious. A political difference is always on the shore of its own disappearance” (Rancière 
2010, 39). Genuine democracy is disruptive and embraces its own impermanence within the 
bounds of ordinary democracy. It is a time of here and now, for the founding is the past and the 
shore of politics is unreachable. Genuine democracy exists in the immediate political times of 
disruption and protest less “a political or governmental regime (of equal participation or 
representation) among other less democratic ones, but as the constitution of a political subject 
through a manifestation and demonstration of injustice or ‘a wrong’” (Simons and Masschelein 
2010, 513). Democracy is the temporary formation of like-minded individuals into groups, to 
gather and oppose the police actions in enforcing the ‘wrong’, rather than replacing one 
democracy with another.
56
 Acting outside institutionalization but also within the system of the 
visible and knowable, protest becomes the act of democrats as outsiders. For Rancière genuine 
democracy accepts the oligarchic tendencies of government yet rejects the cessation of politics 
and disruption within that government.  
                                                 
56
 However, I do not discuss it in this paper see chapter 8 in Rancière’s Dis-Agreement for a fuller discussion of the 
“wrong” that is brought about by the police. 
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Section 4: Conclusion  
The thought of these thinkers displays a clear conception of the creation of; adaptation to; 
and resistance against ordinary governance by an ethos of genuine politics. This ethos disrupts 
the monolithic structure of government to allowing a movement of citizen controlled 
antagonism. Wolin’s search for a continuous politics that resists constitution yet ultimately 
surrenders leads to Arendt’s mourning of a “lost” revolutionary treasure. As Arendt points out 
the lens of the French Revolution (and all subsequent revolutions it birthed and births), the desire 
to re-found will result in an anti-genuine political establishment. The achievement of a founding 
results in the nature of ordinary democracy. In this post-constitutional landscape, a politics and 
machinery of government clashes with the disruptive nature of the extra people who refused to 
go home. Subsequently these outbreaks of genuine democracy fear neither the “loss” of 
revolutionary treasure, nor the fear a “fugitive” democracy. Disciples of genuine democracy act 
with a disruptive temper within ordinary democracy yet do not seek the obligation of a singular 
(re)founding through the overthrow of the democratic structure because a (re)founding cannot 
occur. The structure of ordinary democracy defines the extreme parameters of genuine 
democracy instead of seeking continuous partial (re)founding, disrupting the hegemony of 
ordinary democracy and allowing citizens to pool their political tendencies into repeated re-
involvement.  
Genuine democracy does not exist as an opposite structure to ordinary democracy, nor 
does it seek to overthrow established democratic structures. It is formless politics described by 
Wolin based on what Rancière describes a logic that is not one. Genuine acts within ordinary 
democracy, breaking up the hegemony of the established system and allowing new participants 
and ideas traction within the political sphere. Politics is by nature active and disruptive. Citizens 
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cannot passively belong to a system of politics; they must act, vocalize their views, and disrupt 
ordinary processes that accompany ruling.  
“Agitation” acts as the counterweight within ordinary democracy to prevent a stoppage of 
politics. Politics and genuine democracy depend on constant movement and motion, which 
moves politics along. That is not to say that genuine democracy is always progressive toward an 
ends, rather, its goal is expansion of a political citizenry. The cessation of politics creates a 
structural orthodoxy of democracy. 
 For these thinkers “democracy”--as governing structure and political ideal--remains a 
challenge, in its enacting and the continuation of democratic principles. For Arendt this 
constitution leaves behind the need for agitative democratic movements and results in a 
permanent, stable, and equal governing structure. However, Wolin rejects the Arendtian 
satisfaction with constitution and seeks instead permanent revolution, revolution as process. 
Inevitably, the process ends, constituting a new political system. Yet Wolin and Arendt follow a 
similar path, genuine democracy exists pre-founding in the form of non-constituted agitation 
leading to ordinary governance in the form of constitution. Standing on the other side of the gulf 
created by constitution, where political actors cannot return, Rancière advocates renewing 
continuous genuine action against a permanent ordinary democratic government. Speaking from 
the vantage of a “post”-constituted political system, this “retroactively” applies to Sheldon Wolin 
and Hannah Arendt as well. 
 The attempt to define and describe a genuine democratic viewpoint stems from that fact 
that it has been lost. There would be no need to define and advocate achieving something that 
currently exists. Each of these authors has, in their thinking described a feeling of “loss’ that 
relates to an absence of a democracy free of structure and form. Taking as a fulcrum point the 
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constitution or establishment of democracy necessarily gives form and structure to something 
that previously was not there. In some ways this is productive, “If men were angels” we would 
have no need of such structure. What these thinkers have shown is that the establishment of 
structure has gone too far. Instead of government providing rules and guidelines for the practice 
of politics, ordinary democracy dictates the terms upon which we practice politics. The 
reclamation of politics comes from the disruption of established structures. Short of overthrow, 
genuine democracy seeks to re-organize the petrification of ordinary democracy allowing greater 
movement. Genuine democracy is not a fight lacking in all structure, rather, it uses existing 
structure to push against, gaining momentum from that which contains it. 
Genuine democracy, as these thinkers conceive and debate, requires the sovereignty of 
individuals, each and no person (for better or worse) able through station or education to tell the 
demos what to do. That this the process that we cannot discredit, it is in understanding the 
political equality of individuals, that each has the same access to speech as anyone else, that we 
understand what it means to be genuinely democratic.  
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